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average GNP annual growth rate of 8.6%.  What makes China's reforms differ from
those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the sustained entry and expansion
of the non-state sector.  We argue that the organization structure of the economy
matters.  Unlike their unitary hierarchical structure based on functional or
specialization principles (the U-form), China's hierarchical economy has been the
multi-layer-multi-regional one mainly based on territorial principle (the deep M-form,
or briefly, the M-form).  Reforms have further decentralized the M-form economy
along regional lines, which provided flexibility and opportunities for carrying out
regional experiments, for the rise of non-state enterprises, and for the emergence of
markets.  This is why China's non-state sector share of industrial output increased
from 22% in 1978 to 47% in 1991 and its private sector's share from zero to about
10%, both being achieved without mass privatization and changes in the political
system.
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1. Introduction
Recently, there has been a revived interest among economists in China's
economic reforms.  Since 1979, economic reforms in China have generated a
significant growth across the board:  the overall performance of the Chinese economy
has been better than its own past record, better than most developing countries at
similar development levels, and also better than Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, both before and after their radical transformations in 1989.  It appears
that China had no coherent reform programs, no commitment to private ownership,
and no changes in the political system, and China's economy was still not fully
liberalized.  From both the theoretical and policy perspectives, China's different
reform strategies and outstanding reform performances are particularly interesting
and puzzling.
The economic reforms in China formally started in 1979 following the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978.
The starting time was later than that of Yugoslavia (1950) and Hungary (1968) and
was about the same as for Poland (1980), and earlier than the Soviet Union (1986).
Between 1979 and 1991, China's GNP grew at an average annual rate of 8.6%, or at
7.2% on the per capita basis.   In 1992, the growth of GNP reached 12.8%.   Exports2 3
grew at a faster pace, so that China's export-GNP ratio increased from below 5% in
1978 to nearly 20% in 1991.   Also in this period, inflation was kept within a single-4
digit range except for three years (11.9% in 1985, 20.7% in 1988 and 16.3% in 1989);
2the household bank deposits to GNP ratio increased from 6% in 1978 to 46% in 1991;
and the government budget deficit accounted for about 2-3% of GNP, about half of
which was financed from bond issues (Table 1.1).
Even more convincing evidence of the success of the reform is the increase in
consumption and consumer durable goods by an average Chinese consumer in
physical terms.  For example, between 1978 and 1991, an average Chinese consumer
increased his/her consumption about three times for edible vegetable oil, pork, and
eggs (Table 1.2).  In the rural areas, which account for about 75% of total population,
the living space per person increased about 130% between 1978 and 1991 (Table 1.3).
The average per household consumer durable goods, such as television sets,
refrigerators and washing machines, also increased dramatically.  For instance, in
1991, on average, every two rural households had one television set, and every urban
household had more than one (Tables 1.4 and 1.5).  There is no doubt that China is
still a low-income developing country, but the evidence reveals clearly a substantial
improvement in living standards due to economic reforms.
The Chinese economic performance is in contrast to that of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union.  Even if the two-digit annual decline of GNP in 1990 and
1991 in these countries was largely transitory, the magnitude was still too large to be
ignored.  What is more important, but tends to be neglected, is the economic
stagnation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the decade of 1980s before the
radical changes.  According to official statistics, the average growth rate of GDP in
Hungary was 1.8% between 1981 and 1985 and almost zero in 1988 and 1989.  In
Poland, the average GDP growth rate was less than 2% between 1981 and 1989.   The5
situation in the Soviet Union was no better.
3Political considerations aside, two arguments often come into discussions on
the differences between China and Eastern Europe.  The first argument is about
different levels of economic development:  Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were
at a much higher development stage than China -- China had a very low per capita
income with a dominant agriculture sector while the Eastern European and Soviet
economies were "over-industrialized."   The second argument is about different6
reform strategies:  China has followed a gradual and piecemeal approach as opposed
to the "big bang" strategy in most of after 1989 Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, like the shock therapy for stabilization in Poland and Russia, and fast and
mass privatization in Czechoslovakia.7
We feel that both views are relevant but unsatisfactory, or at least, are
incomplete.  China's level of industrialization was perhaps higher than most people
would think.  In 1978, China's gross industrial output value accounted for 62% of the
total output value of society (35% in heavy industry and 27% in light industry),
despite the fact that only 29% of the total labor force was employed in the non-
agriculture sector.  In terms of GNP, China's industry accounted for about half in
1978, as compared to 60% to 65% in Eastern Europe.  Furthermore, in China, reforms
have been more successful in the more industrialized regions with a weak central
government control (like provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang).  Reforms
have not been very successful in both the less industrialized regions (like the
Northwest provinces) and the more industrialized regions with a strong central
government control (like Shanghai and provinces of Liaoning and Jilin), the latter
share similar problems of the earlier Hungarian reform.  This fact suggests that one
cannot explain the success of the reforms by low level of development alone.
4The argument for gradualism also raises more questions than answers.  First,
the agricultural reform in China proceeded very fast in the early 1980s.  The
abolishment of the commune system and the nationwide execution of the household
responsibility system (an ownership reform) was implemented almost at one stroke,
thus can be viewed as a big bang.  More importantly, Eastern Europe's radical
transition should not be examined in isolation:  it came after deep troubles or failures
of many years of gradual reform.  In fact, the Hungarian reform started in 1968 with
some initial success, but then ran into difficulties in the 1980s.  Ironically, in several
aspects China followed Eastern Europe's gradual reform measures.  If China's
gradualism is a success, why has it worked in China but not in Eastern Europe?  On
the other hand, why was China's success not a temporary one, and will China soon
encounter problems similar to Hungary's?
In this paper, we propose a theory to explain the differences between China's
reforms and those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  We first make an
observation and provide extended evidence showing that, unlike the case of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, sustained entry and expansion of the non-state sector
in China during the reforms were forceful and fast enough to become an important
engine of growth by the end of the 1980s.   We then theorize an institutional reason8
which is responsible for this phenomenal expansion and for the concurrent emergence
of the market.  We argue that the difference in the initial institutional conditions
concerning the organizational structure of the planning hierarchy plays important
roles in different transition paths of China and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.  The organization structures of both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
were of a unitary form based on the functional or specialization principles (the "U-
5form" economy), and in contrast, the Chinese hierarchy has been of a multi-layer-
multi-regional form mainly based on a territorial principle since 1958 (the "deep M-
form" economy, or in short, the "M-form" economy).  The M-form structure has been
further decentralized along regional lines during reform with both increased authority
and incentives for regional governments, which provided flexibility and opportunities
for carrying out regional experiments, for the rise of non-state enterprises, and for the
emergence of markets.  Our institutional approach is able not only to incorporate and
link together aspects of the arguments concerning the level of development and
gradualism, but also to explain richer phenomena such as the successful use of
experiments in China but not elsewhere.
Under the M-form organization in China, interdependence between regional
economies is not as strong as that of the U-form organization in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, because each region is relatively "self-contained."  Unlike in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, regional governments in China (be it province, county,
or township, village) have had considerable responsibility of coordination within the
region.  In particular, a large number of state-owned enterprises, including many in
heavy industries, were subordinated under the regional governments even before the
economic reforms.  Hence, each region was relatively self-sufficient, the scale of an
enterprise was small, and industries were less concentrated.  In this environment,
regional experiments can be carried out in a less costly way because the disruptive
effect to the rest of the economy is minimal.  A successful experiment in one region
also has greater relevancy to other regions since adjacent regions are similar.
When the M-form economy was further decentralized along regional lines in
reform and the constraints on local government were gradually removed, the bottom
6level regional governments (i.e., townships and villages in the rural areas, and
districts and neighborhoods in the urban areas) gained substantial autonomy in
developing their own regions.  They establish enterprises outside the state sector and
outside the plan.  From their inception, those non-state enterprises (most of them are
not private though) have been market oriented.  Furthermore, competition between
regions for getting rich fast puts pressure on the local governments to concentrate on
growth and their limited access to bank credits maintains discipline on their behavior.
This explains how the rise of the non-state sector occurred by gradually weakening
the existing hierarchical control without destroying the existing structure at one
stroke.
Of course, administrative decentralization induces, at the initial stage, costs of
regional conflict, market protection, wasteful duplication, inefficient small scales of
production and increased administrative intervention by local governments.  We do
not argue against these opinions but we would like to focus on a neglected but
important aspect of benefits of a multi-layer-multi-regional form of organization, that
is, the flexibility of the system for experiments and hence for institutional changes,
and the opportunity provided to facilitate entry and expansion of the non-state sector
outside the plan.  The unexpected, and perhaps unintentional, growth of the non-state
sector is critical for the success of China's economic reforms.
Based on Chandler's seminal work (1966), Williamson (1975) first used the
terms "U-form" and "M-form" in his study of business firms in the U.S.  The U-form
referred to the unitary organizational form of the firm along functional lines in the
second half of 1800s and early 1900s, while the M-form referred to the multi-
divisional form of the firm organized by product, by technology, or by geography,
7which emerged since the 1920s.  Compared with departments in the U-form firms,
divisions in the multi-divisional firms are more self-contained, their responsibility for
coordination and profit inside the division is high.  The regional governments in our
multi-layer-multi-regional structure economy share these features.  However, our
concept is not simply an application or an extension of the Chandler-Williamson's
concept from firms to economies.  There are important differences between the two
concepts.  In a multi-divisional firm, decentralization occurs exactly at the level of
general office and the divisions, and each division is often organized by functions.
In contrast, in our concept of the M-form economy, decentralization occurs at all
levels of the hierarchy, that is, the M-form is deep.  This is critically important:  it is
exactly because of the autonomy and incentives provided to the bottom levels of the
regional governments in China, could the non-state sector grow so fast.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 clarifies the
definition of China's non-state sector and private sector.  Section 3 provides empirical
evidence on the sustained entry and expansion of the non-state sector between 1979
and 1991.  Section 4 first characterizes institutions of the U-form hierarchies of
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the M-form hierarchy of China before the
reform, and then describes several Chinese reform policies that are responsible for
further decentralization along regional lines.  Section 5 makes a general and
preliminary analysis on the costs and benefits of the M-form organization vis-a-vis
the U-form and the implications for transition.  Section 6 explains specifically how
the phenomenal expansion of the non-state sector in China is made possible under
its M-form hierarchical organization.  The final concluding section discusses
implications of the non-state sector for further reforms in China and lessons from the
8Chinese experience for other economies in transition.
2. What Is the Non-State Sector in China?9
2.1.  The Non-State Sector
Before defining the non-state sector, we should first define the state sector.  In
China, by the constitution, the state-owned enterprises are owned by the "whole
people."  In practice, every state-owned enterprise is affiliated with one of the
following four levels of government: (1) central; (2) provincial (with a population size
of dozens of millions); (3) prefecture (with a population size of several millions); and
(4) county (with a population size of several hundreds of thousands).  A municipality
is treated as one of the levels of province, prefecture or county, with a majority being
at the level of a prefecture.  Typically, the responsible government delegates the
supervision of "its" state-owned enterprises to the industrial ministries/bureaus.
Therefore, even for the state-owned enterprises, they are not homogeneous in terms
of control.
The non-state sector consists of all enterprises not in the state-sector, and it
includes the private sector as a sub-sector.  According to the location of its
supervising government (if it has one), a non-state enterprise is designated as either
an urban enterprise or a rural enterprise.   By 1991, there were three categories of10
non-state ownership in China's official statistics: "collective ownership," "individual
ownership," and "other types of ownership."  Table 2.1 below provides a detailed
picture with both official and alternative classifications:
9Table 2.1  China: Classification of the Non-State Sector
OFFICIAL
CLASSIFICATION Collectives Individual Others
Urban  District Neighborhood Urban Urban Private;
Enterprises Enterprises Cooperatives Individual
Foreign
joint
ventures;
Other
joint
ventures
Rural Township  Village Rural Rural
Enterprises Enterprises Cooperatives Individual
(TVEs)
ALTERNATIVE
CLASSIFICATION Community Private
(A) Collectives (jiti).  Urban collectives include (i) enterprises that are affiliated
with a district government under a municipality or a county ("large" collectives,
dajiti); (ii) enterprises that are affiliated with a neighborhood under a district ("small"
collectives, xiaojiti); and (iii) urban cooperatives (chengzhen hezuo).  Many urban
collectives are subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises which receive some transferred
assets from the parent firms and hire their surplus employees or the employees'
spouses and children.  The advantages of subsidiaries being registered as collectives
under the supervision of lower level government is less government control and more
business flexibility.11
Rural collectives include (i) enterprises that are affiliated with a township
(xiang or zhen) government; (ii) enterprises that are affiliated with a village (cun)
government; and (iii) rural cooperatives (nongcun hezuo).  The predecessors of
township and village enterprises (TVEs) were commune and brigade enterprises
(CBEs) emerging during the Great Leap Forward in 1958.  The ownership form of
10
township and village enterprises is truly a Chinese invention that has not been found
elsewhere.
(B) Individual Business (geti).  These are household/individual businesses
hiring no more than 7 employees.  An individual business has been allowed to
operate since 1978.
(C) Other Types of Ownership (qita leixing).  This category includes mainly (i)
private enterprises hiring more than 7 employees (siying); (ii) foreign enterprises and
joint ventures with foreigners (sanzi qiye); and (iii) other types of joint ventures (e.g.,
a joint venture between state and private enterprises) and joint-stock companies.
These types of ownership did not emerge until the early 1980s.12
2.2.  The Private Sector
Defining the non-state sector in China is easy, but defining the private sector
is not.  As seen above, a "private enterprise" is defined in China as a private business
establishment hiring more than 7 employees.  This narrow definition is on purpose,
in order to circumvent ideological difficulties.  For example, an individual/household
hiring no more than 7 employees is classified as an "individual business," not as a
"private enterprise," although it is certainly part of the private sector.  So are sole
foreign business establishments.  As for joint ventures and joint-stock companies,
strictly speaking, only those shares that are owned by foreigners and domestic private
parties can be regarded as in the private sector.   Some "cooperatives" are more like13
partnerships hiring many employees.  This is especially true in Southern China, and
in some areas they are called "joint stock cooperatives" (gufen hezuo).  In addition,
some township and village enterprises and urban district and neighborhood
11
enterprises are de facto private enterprises with vaguely defined ownership under the
name of collectives.14
Lacking further information and taking approximations, our definition of the
private sector in China in this paper will include individual ownership, cooperative
ownership, and other types of ownership under the official classification, and will
exclude all of the township and village enterprises.  We speculate that this should not
give too much bias in either direction for data prior to 1992.  The remaining part of
the collectives, that is, enterprises affiliated with an urban district or neighborhood
and with a rural township or village (TVEs), can be regarded as the community
sector.
3.  Sustained Entry and Expansion of the Non-State Sector in China:  Evidence
3.1.  General Features
From 1978 to 1991, the share of the non-state sector in national non-agriculture
employment increased from about 40% to 57%.  However, this happened not because
of privatization or conversion of state enterprises to non-state enterprises.  It is
mainly due to entry and expansion of new non-state enterprises.  In fact, employment
by the state sector increased from 75 million in 1978 to 107 million in 1991.  Its share
declined because employment in the non-state sector grew even faster:  from 21
million to 44 million in the urban area and from 28 million to 96 million in the rural
during the same period.
China's non-state sector is engaged in all kinds of activities: construction,
transportation, commerce, service, and in particular, industry.  This is perhaps a
crucial difference between China's non-state sector and the private sector in Eastern
12
Europe, particularly before 1989.   During the period from 1981 to 1990, the national15
average annual growth rate of gross industrial output was 12.6%, in which the state
sector grew at 7.7%, collectives at 18.7%, individual business at 92.2% and other types
of ownership at 42.7%.  As a result, the share of the non-state industry in the national
total has expanded gradually from 22% in 1978 to 47% in 1991, and accordingly, the
share of the state sector in industrial output shrunk from 78% to 53%.  To put this
into a historical perspective, the share of the state sector in 1991 is already below the
level in 1957, which was 54% (Table 3.1).16
The change of ownership composition of Chinese industry toward the non-
state sector did not happen overnight.  In fact, the process started before 1979.
Although the true private industry in China did not appear until the early 1980s, the
collectives had grown from 11% out of the national total in 1969 to 22% in 1978, or
about one percent increase in output share every year (Table 3.1).  However, the
dramatic shift of weight toward the non-state sector has been apparent since 1979:
The non-state sector in industry has on average experienced an increase in industrial
share two percentage points every year for 13 years.17
Accompanied by the high growth rate, the non-state sector is also more
efficient than the state sector.  The annual growth rate of the total factor productivity
of the non-state enterprises was much higher than that of the state enterprises.   If18
one ranks all China's provinces according to their shares of the non-state sector in
industrial output, the top five, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong and Fujian,
are precisely those provinces that have much higher growth than the national
average.   An interesting counter example of the coastal region is Shanghai.19
Shanghai was one of the most important financial and industrial centers in the Far
13
East before 1949 and was also the industrial base after 1949.  Shanghai has a low
share of the non-state sector in industry as compared to the national average:  22%
in 1985 and 32% in 1990.  For the period from 1984 to 1989, Shanghai's industry grew
only 7.9%, well below the national average.  Shanghai's share of industrial output
dropped from 10% in 1985 to only 6.8% in 1989, below that of Jiangsu, Shandong or
Guangdong.
Three additional characteristics about the entry and expansion of the non-state
sector in China should be especially emphasized.  First, the substantial entry and
expansion occurred not because of an intentional design of a reform program from
the central government, to the contrary, it came largely from the local initiatives.  The
central government's tolerance is mainly because it solves unemployment problems
without much financial support from the state.  Second, and related to the first, there
has been a large variance in terms of organizational and developmental patterns of
non-state-owned enterprises across regions.  For example, while export and foreign
investment have played important roles in some parts of Guangdong and Fujian, they
are not so vital in many other high-growth provinces.  On the other hand, township
and village enterprises are a dominant force of the non-state sector in Jiangsu and
Shandong, but individual, partnership and private enterprises are much more
important in Zhejiang.
Third, by 1991, the collectives and joint-ventures are the dominant majority of
the non-state sector, and privately-owned enterprises played a minor role on the
national scale.  The collectives and joint-ventures have larger scale of operation,
employ better technology, and absorb more human capital.  This is because in China,
there is still a lack of legal protection of private property rights, let alone commitment
14
to private ownership.  Private firms often face discrimination in obtaining credit,
labor and material supplies (Nee, 1992).  Local government ownerships like a
township or a village enterprise can be viewed as an institutional response to such
an environment, in which they have comparative advantages over both private and
state ownerships.  They are "politically correct," protected by at least some level of
government, and they also enjoy the flexibility of business operation that the state-
owned enterprises are lacking.20
3.2.  The Non-State Sector in the Rural Areas -- Township, Village and Private
Enterprises
Within the non-state sector, the largest and the most dynamic part is the
segment of rural enterprises, also known as Township, Village and Private
Enterprises (TVPs).  Between 1978 and 1991, the number of rural enterprises increased
from 1.5 million to 19.1 million and employment increased from 28.3 million to 96.1
million.  Between 1981 and 1990, the total output by rural enterprises grew at an
annual rate of 29%, in which the industrial output grew at 28%, much higher than
the national average of 13%.  Exports by township and village enterprises (excluding
private enterprises) increased at an average annual rate of 65.6% from 1986 to 1990
(Table 3.2).
About three-quarters of the total output of the rural enterprises came from
industry in 1990, light industry accounting for 55% and heavy industry for 45%.   For21
example, in 1990, rural enterprises produced about one third of coal, 40% of canned
food and one half of electric fans in China (Table 3.3).  With the rapid growth of rural
enterprises, their status in the national economy has changed from a subsidiary sector
15
of agriculture to an important engine of growth.  Between 1979 and 1990, as a percent
of the national total, employment increased from 23% to 39%, total output increased
from 7% to 22%, and industrial output increased from 9% to 25%.  Export from
township and village enterprises (excluding private enterprises) accounted for 24%
of the national total in 1990 (Table 3.4).  By all measures, the Chinese rural enterprises
had already expanded to more than half of the non-state sector and to about one-
quarter to one-third of the national total by 1991.
The rapid growth of the rural enterprises has changed the industrial structure
of the Chinese rural areas as well.  In 1980, the share of agriculture in gross output
value in rural areas was 69% and the share of non-agriculture was 31%, of which
industry accounted for only 20%.  Ten years later, in 1990 the share of agriculture
output dropped to 46% and the share of non-agriculture output increased to 54%, of
which industry accounted for 40%.22
 
3.3.  Emergence of the Private Sector
The private sector in China did not appear until the late 1970s and private
industry only started in the early 1980s.  There was a tremendous increase in the
number of private industrial enterprises in the 1980s.  In terms of share of industrial
output, a significant decline in urban collectives (from 45% to 29%) was accompanied
by a surge in individual rural business (from 4% to 11%) and other types of
ownership (from 3% to 10%), as shown in Table 3.5.  According to our definition, the
private sector's share of industrial output inside the non-state sector increased from
13% in 1985 to 27% in 1990, doubling in five years.  Using a more conservative
estimate (only one half of the "others" counted as private), about 10% of the total
16
national industrial output was produced by privately owned enterprises in 1990, up
from 5% in 1985.  The expansion of the private sector was remarkably faster in rural
areas.  Employment by the rural private sector was about 24% and total output about
14% of the rural total in 1984, the corresponding numbers increased to 49% and 33%,
respectively, in 1988 (Table 3.6).
An important part of the private sector in China is "individual business."
China restored individually or household operated business in 1978 and since then,
this segment of the private sector has registered rapid growth in both urban and rural
areas, largely in industrial and commercial enterprises.  Between 1981 and 1988, the
number of individually-run enterprises increased seven-fold, from 1.8 million to 14.5
million, and employment increased nine-fold, from 2.3 million to 23.0 million (Table
3.7).
4.  The M-Form and U-Form Hierarchical Structures
The phenomenal entry and expansion of the non-state sector distinguishes
China's reform from the Eastern European reforms.  Among many reasons which
may explain these phenomena are the institutional differences between the (deep) M-
form organization in China and the U-form organization in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, and the subsequent Chinese reform policies of further decentralization
along regional lines which had a major influence on both the transition path and
performance.
4.1.  The U-Form Hierarchy of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the economies were organized in the
17
U-form in which hierarchical information flow and control were organized into a
unitary form by functional or specialization principle.   Most enterprises were23
grouped by industry and under the direct supervision of ministries, and regional
governments were primarily subordinates of the center and their roles were limited
to collecting information from below and implementing plans from above without
much autonomy.24
In order to fully utilize the scale economy and to avoid conflicting operations,
there was little overlapping of functions among ministries in a U-form hierarchical
economy.  Enterprises were highly specialized and their sizes were extremely large.
This led to extraordinary industrial concentration.  Because of the strong
interdependence between enterprises across different regions, comprehensive
planning and administrative coordination between ministries at the top level of the
government were crucial for the normal operation of the U-form economy in the
absence of the market.  To show the complexity, for example, in the late 1970's there
were 62 ministries under the Gosplan in the Soviet Union.  There were about 48,000
plan "positions" for about 12 million products planned and coordinated by the
Gosplan (Nove, 1983).
There are several reasons why the Soviet economy was organized in the U-
form.  First, from the very beginning, the Soviets had an ideological obsession on the
scale economy and gigantic factories.   The U-form organization takes advantage25
fully of the scale economy and specialization.  We saw often in the Soviet Union that
one or a few gigantic firms produced one product for the whole economy.
Particularly when the economy was at a lower stage of development and the
objective was clear and the decision-making was relatively simple, the U-form
18
organization was effective in mobilizing scarce resources to catch up quickly
(Gerschenkron, 1962).  Second, when the Soviet Union began to establish a centralized
economy in the 1920s, the U-form was the only way of organizing industrial activities
within large corporations in the West, as the multi-divisional firms in capitalist
economies had not yet emerged.  The claims of Lenin and Kautsky about establishing
a socialist economy as a gigantic factory also reflected the prevailing knowledge
about economic organization at that time.  Third, there were political reasons for the
U-form organization, particularly under Stalin, to achieve better control by Moscow
over the Soviet Republics and the Eastern European countries.  Because each region
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republic was made a branch of the grand hierarchy,
all regions became strongly interdependent, and ultimately, were dependent on
Moscow.
When the economy becomes more complex, defects in the U-form organization
become serious.  In order to change the organization structure, Nikita Khrushchev in
1957 abolished the ministries all together and introduced 105 Regional Economic
Councils (Sovnarkhozy), to which all the state enterprises were subordinated.
However, this reform didn't go very far and soon failed.  Given the already very
concentrated industrial structure, a change from a unitary form to a multi-regional
form required both political changes and economic changes.  The power of ministries
would be weakened, large enterprises would be broken up or new duplicating
enterprises would be established, all of them were very costly.  In 1965, blaming of
the growing "localism" of the Sovnarkhozy and the difficulties of coordinating a
regionally operated planning apparatus, the regional coordination system was
replaced by the former ministerial system (Gregory and Stuart, 1981).
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4.2.  The M-Form Hierarchy of China
In China there are six administrative levels:  central, provincial, prefecture,
county, township (previously, commune) and village (previously, brigade).  In urban
areas, there are three levels:  municipality, district and neighborhood.  In China's
official language, regions at each level are called "blocks" (kuaikuai), as opposed to
"branches" (tiaotiao), the bureaucratic supervision along the lines of function and
specialization.   Instead of mainly following functional or specialization principles26
like those in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Chinese economy is organized
into a multi-layer-multi-regional form mainly according to territorial principle, in
which each region at each layer can be regarded as an operating unit.  Each unit is
further divided along geographic lines and at the same time the unit controls its own
enterprises along functional and specialization lines.  Regions are relatively self-
contained; that is, they are self-sufficient in terms of functions and supplies in
production.
Directly under the control of the central government are 30 province-level
regions (blocks) and a few dozen functional and industrial ministries (branches).
Before the economic reform which began in 1979, industries in China were much less
concentrated than those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and there
was a large number of state-owned industrial enterprises not controlled by the central
government.  This is true for light industries, as well as for heavy industries.  In 1978,
the share of industrial output of state-owned enterprises controlled by the central
government was less than one-half of the national total (Wong, 1987).  In the
automobile industry, almost all enterprises in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
were directly controlled by the central government and the number of the enterprises
20
was rather small.  In China, there were 58 enterprises making automobiles before the
reform, and most of them were controlled by the local governments (Wang and Chen,
1991).  Consistent with this, the number of products directly under the central plan
in China was much smaller, only 791 in 1979 (Zhu, 1985), as compared to more than
twelve million in the former Soviet Union in the late 1970s (Nove, 1980).  With a
much reduced work load, the desired number of ministries in the center is much
smaller than in the Soviet Union (less than 30 vs. more than 60).
The hierarchical structure of each region at each level is a copy of that of the
central government.  For example, a county has about ten to twenty townships.  The
county government controls the enterprises affiliated to the county government by
functional line and specialization principal (e.g., finance, textile, food processing,
electronics, etc.), and it also oversees township governments within its territory.
Similarly, a township controls its own enterprises in addition to the oversight of its
villages.
The commune system in the rural area between 1958 and 1984 provides a good
example of showing some of the features of the bottom level of the M-form hierarchy.
A commune (now township) government was a bottom level government in China
(only the level of village is below it).  Far from having specialization and division of
labor, a commune encompassed all kinds of activities of industry, agriculture,
commerce, education, entertainment and even military ("people's militia").  The
counterpart of the commune in urban areas is the neighborhood committee, which
similarly has many of its own collective enterprises.
It should be clear that the difference between China's M-form hierarchy and
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe U-form hierarchy is more than the relationship
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at the top level between the central government and the provincial government.  On
the one hand, the CMEA as a whole should not be regarded as a large M-form
hierarchy in our sense, since within each CMEA country, the economy is organized
according to the functional lines exclusively.  On the other hand, the internal
structure of a province in China is different from that of an Eastern European
country, even though the size may be similar.  For example, Hungary with a U-form
hierarchy has a different organizational structure from Guangdong province of China.
As a province, Guangdong is a part of the large hierarchy of China.  But Guangdong
itself is also organized in an M-form, with multiple-regions consisting of prefectures,
counties, townships and villages, and all of them are self-contained economic units.
There are several reasons for China's economic organization to evolve to the
M-form.  First, historically, before the Chinese Communist Party fully took power of
China in 1949, both the economy and the military force in regions under Communist
control were organized in an M-form.  The organizational heritages and skills
accumulated in history have a deep influence on the evolution of organization
structure of the Chinese economy.  Second, technologically, poor communication and
transportation facilities in a large country makes the M-form organization an easier
choice for the Chinese.  Third, politically, nationalism was less a problem in China
than in the Soviet Union and Mao had many other means (for example, political
movements) to hold the country together.  Fourth, militarily, as Mao was worried
about the Soviet and American air-raid invasion and the Third World War, industries
were dispersed into inland areas and turned into the supervision of the regional
governments.  Finally, culturally, there is vast classical literature in China on the arts
of managing multi-regional organization because for more than two thousand years
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the Chinese empires were basically organized along regional lines.
China's M-form hierarchical structure has evolved since 1958.  Because of
ideological and political reasons, China's first five year plan (1953-57) was formulated
with the help of the Soviet experts, which was a process of copying the Soviet model
-- the U-form organization -- into the Chinese economy.  Toward the end of the first
five year plan, Mao increasingly dissatisfied with the over-centralization and
bureaucratization in the Soviet model.  In his famous 1956 speech on the ten major
relationships, Mao discussed the relationship between the central and the local
governments and advocated the ideas of "mobilizing two initiatives of both central
and local governments" (diaodong zhongyang he difang liangge jijixing) and "walking on
two feet" (liangtiaotui zoulu), the latter referring to development of both central and
local industries.   These ideas later became official government policies and were27
implemented subsequently.
Under Mao's initiative, China started to deviate from the Soviet model and
moved toward the direction known as "administrative decentralization" within the
hierarchy.  Two major waves of administrative decentralization occurred in 1958 (the
Great Leap Forward) and in 1970 (the Cultural Revolution):  the central government's
bureaucracy was trimmed; supervision authority of many state-owned enterprises
were delegated from the ministries to provinces and cities or even counties; and local
governments' initiatives for developing their regions were encouraged.  The legacy
of Mao had great impact on the organizational structure of the Chinese economy.  As
far as the initial institutional conditions for economic reforms are concerned, China's
multi-layer-multi-regional hierarchical structure prior to 1979 was already
substantially different from that of the unitary hierarchical form inherited in Eastern
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Europe and the Soviet Union before their economic reforms.
4.3.  Reform Policies of Further Decentralization Along Regional Lines in China
However, the role of local governments before the economic reform was still
limited compared to that after the economic reform.  Before 1979, as the fiscal system
remained very centralized, the local government had little financial resources for
regional development.  Autonomy of the local governments was also limited given
the constraint of central planning and the use of markets not being officially
sanctioned.  Furthermore, the Chinese economy was a closed one without
informational and technological exchanges with the rest of the world.
The subsequent reforms since 1979 opened up the Chinese economy to the
outside world.  The scope of planning was gradually reduced and the use of the
market was encouraged.  More importantly, several reform polices were carried out
that have made authorities, information and incentives being decentralized to the
regional governments.  It is only after these complementary reform policies that
initiatives of the regional governments were mobilized and the market emerged
beyond the boundary of each region.  The reform policies of decentralization were
mainly reflected in the following aspects:
First, a fiscal revenue sharing system between any two adjacent levels of
governments was implemented starting from 1980.   Although schemes vary both28
across regions and in time, the basic idea is that a lower-level regional government
contracts with the upper-level regional government on the total amount (or share) of
taxes/profits revenue (negative means subsidies) to be remitted for the next several
years, and the lower-level government keeps the rest.
24
Consider, for example, the fiscal sharing schemes between the central and
provincial (local) government.  There are two categories of revenue incomes in any
province:  central revenues and local revenues.  Division between the central and
local revenues is by source (for example customs duties are central revenue and
turnover taxes are local revenue) and by affiliation of enterprises (for example, profit
taxes from centrally-control enterprises are central revenue and that from
provincially-controlled enterprises are local revenue).  Only local revenue is subject
to revenue sharing, and there have been four major types of sharing schemes (Wong,
1992):  (A) To remit a lump sum (possibly with an annual increment) and retain the
rest.  (This applied to only two experimental southern provinces of Guangdong and
Fujian first); (B) To remit a portion which is fixed for four to five years.  (This is for
the majority of provinces); (C) To remit a portion which is set annually.  (This applied
to the three cash cows of industrial cities (which have provincial ranks) of Beijing,
Shanghai and Tianjin); (D) To receive a fixed amount of subsidies.  (This applied first
to four poor provinces in the Northwest, and later to a total of nine provinces).
Starting from 1988, most provinces shifted to schemes (A) and (D), which have the
strongest incentive effects.  For example, Shanghai contracted with the central
government for remitting a fixed 10.5 billion yuan since 1988.
Second, the so-called "extra-budgetary" revenues (i.e., the second budget) by
the local governments and ministries were expanded.  Eighty percent of these funds
belongs to state-owned enterprises as retained profits over which the local
governments and ministries have substantial control.  Before the reform, the extra-
budgetary revenue was relatively small, 9% of GNP in 1978 compared to the
budgetary revenue of 35% of GNP.  In 1991, the extra-budgetary revenue was up to
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15% of GNP while the budgetary revenue was down to only 18% of GNP (Sicular,
1992).
Third, the banking system in China was also decentralized with the separation
of the central bank and the specialized banks in 1983.  Although banks were still
owned by the state, each regional branch of the specialized banks was required to
link their total credit extension to deposits collected within the region (cundai guagou).
In case deposits fall short in a specialized bank, it is the regional branch of the central
bank (not the general office of that specialized bank) which is responsible for
reallocating funds within the region or asking for refinancing loans from the central
bank.  This regional based banking institution was also "deep," as the central bank
in China has branches even at the county level.  Although the banking system was
somewhat re-centralized in terms of personnel appointment starting in the fourth
quarter of 1988, the influence of the regional government (through regional branches
of the central bank and specialized banks) on credit remained rather strong.
Fourth, more autonomy was granted and more responsibilities were assigned
to the regional governments.  These include reduced planning scope of the central
government, increased authority of local governments for determining prices, for
setting up new firms, for making investment with "self raised funds," that is, funds
drawn from the "extra-budget" or borrowed from banks.   At the same time, burdens29
of fiscal expenditure were also decentralized, local government assumed greater
responsibility for providing education, health, housing, local infrastructure, etc.
With these reforms, local governments have become almost residual claimants
and they have incentives to maximize local revenues.   Because the local30
government's budgets are highly dependent on local enterprises, they have incentives
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to set up more enterprises using their newly gained authority.  More firms mean
more revenue, more revenue means more resources for regional development.  With
such an decentralization, local governments do not receive a great deal of financial
support from the above and consequently, their responsibilities to the above are also
small.
Decentralization along regional lines in the M-form hierarchy during the
reform had great impact on China's industrial structure.  First, more state-owned
enterprises were delegated to local governments.  In 1985, the state-owned industrial
enterprises controlled by the central government accounted for only 20% of the total
industrial output from enterprises at or above township level, while the provincial
and city government controlled 45% and county government 9% (Table 4.1).  In 1987,
the share of the eight largest steel firms controlled by local governments was 12.3%
as compared to 47.1% for the eight largest steel firms controlled by the central
government (Wang and Chen, 1991).  In contrast, almost all firms in the steel industry
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were directly controlled by the central
governments.  Second, the Chinese industry has become even less concentrated.  For
instance, there are more than 100 color television assembly lines, and every province
has at least one.  The number of enterprises making automobiles increased from 58
before the reform to 116 in 1987 (Wang and Chen, 1991).
Third, the average size of state enterprises in China is much smaller than that
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and is quite close to that in the West.  For
example, in 1988, employment per enterprise in manufacturing was 806 in the Soviet
Union and 460 in Hungary, as compared to 145 in China and 96 in Italy.  In wearing
apparel, the corresponding figures were 6,600 in Czechoslovakia, 307 in Hungary, 80
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in China, and 71 in Italy (Table 4.2).  In spite of twenty years of reform, the average
size of Hungarian enterprises remained substantially larger than that in the West.31
5.   The Costs and Benefits of the U-Form and M-Form Hierarchies and the
Implications for Transition:  A Preliminary Analysis
The costs and benefits of different organizations are determined by the
essential features of the organizational structures.   The important organizational32
features of the unitary form of hierarchies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
(the U-Form) are:  (i) organization mainly by functional or specialization principles;
(ii) regional governments' roles are limited and supplementary; (iii) interdependence
between regions is strong and coordination at the top is critical; and (iv) the size of
enterprises is generally large and industries are very concentrated.  In contrast, the
organizational features of the multi-layer-multi-regional form of hierarchy in China
are:  (i) organization mainly by territorial principle in additional to by functional or
specialization principles; (ii) each region is relatively self-contained and
interdependence between regions is relatively weak; (iii) coordination at all levels is
important but at the top it is not particularly critical; (iv) the size of enterprises
generally is small and industries are less concentrated; and (v) the above features
extend to many levels down to the very bottom.
This characterization helps to clarify the relationship and differences between
our concepts of U-form and (deep) M-form economies and the U-form and M-form
firms in the literature.  It looks as if that, because divisions in a multi-divisional firm
are also organized by product, the organization of the Soviet economy is similar to
a multi-divisional form rather than unitary form.  However, that similarity is
superficial.  From an organizational point of view, relationships between different
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ministries and the role of the center in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union resemble
the relationships between different functional departments in the U-form firms:
interdependence between departments is strong, coordination role of the center is
critical, etc.  On the other hand, China's multi-regional form shares several essential
properties of multi-division firms:  each operating unit (division in a firm and region
in an economy) is self-contained, much of the coordination is delegated to the
operating unit, performance evaluation of each unit is based on comparisons of
performance between units.  One of the differences between M-form economy and
M-form firm is property (v) above, that is, the M-form economy in China is a multi-
layer one, or it is deep.
Based on the above theoretical abstraction, we provide a general and
preliminary analysis of the costs and benefits of the M-form and the U-form
hierarchies and of their implications for transition to a market economy.  The U-form
and M-form organizations affect static and dynamic efficiencies as well as
evolutionary processes of the system.33
Economy of Scale, Specialization, and Industrial Concentration
The U-form economy was designed to explore scale economy through
technology engineering and through specialization and division of labor.   The U-34
form organization is effective in mobilizing scarce resources and concentrating on a
few high priority objectives.  Enterprises in the U-form economy consistently have
the following three features:  a large scale of operation, a narrow scope of products,
and a high degree of vertical integration.  This leads to two significant features of the
U-form economy:  a high degree of industrial concentration and a high level of
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regional specialization.
Compared to the U-form hierarchy, the M-form hierarchy is less efficient in
utilizing scale economies.  The automobile industry in China provides an extreme
example:  there are more than a hundred small-scale state-owned auto makers in
China, each producing on average about ten thousand automobiles annually.  It is
typical that regional governments in China control both heavy and light industries,
and therefore regions are less specialized in products and industries are less
concentrated.  This leads to criticism of China's "local industrialization" for inefficient
scale and wasteful duplications, and for associated regional protectionism and
segmented markets, in particular in the presence of distorted prices and taxes (Wong,
1992).
On the beneficial side, duplication may reduce vulnerability and increase
reliability of supplies under uncertainty.  It may also induce competition and facilitate
technology diffusion into inland areas.  Furthermore, less specialization may also be
more beneficial:  less specialization may reduce coordination costs (Becker and
Murphy, 1992), and less specialization may also make workers more efficient in
learning and in operation, as shown by the Japanese experience (Aoki, 1986).
Coordination
In the M-form economy of China, coordination is distributed at all levels of the
hierarchy:  regional governments have substantial responsibility for coordination in
addition to the important (though not critical) coordinating role of the central
government.   There are two reasons which favor a more decentralized coordination35
vis-a-vis a more centralized one:  First, to the extent that information is initially
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dispersed, local governments have better information than the central government
simply because they are closer to sites.  Hence the local information is better used by
local governments than by the central government for regional development.  Second,
decentralized coordination has lower requirements for capability in communication
and information processing.  The burden of communication and information
processing is reduced since fewer messages need to be transmitted and fewer tasks
need to be coordinated.  Therefore, the M-form hierarchy has advantages when there
is a high degree of complexity in an economy and the communication and
information processing technologies are backward.
However, decentralized coordination may also result in inefficiency when a
market is incomplete (Weitzman, 1974, Bolton and Farrell, 1990, and Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992).  In the case of China, interdependence between economic activities in
different regions is not strong, and a more decentralized coordination is likely
preferred to a more centralized one as in the U-form, other things being equal.   In36
the U-form organization, industries are highly concentrated, the regions are highly
specialized, and operating units of ministries and enterprises alike are strongly
interdependent.  Hence, a rigorous coordination at the center is crucial for
maintaining the normal operation of the economy, and a decentralized coordination
at the regional level may not be efficient.
Responses to External Shocks
With little or no duplication and with strong interdependence between
different units in the U-form economy, once a shock hits one unit, which may be the
only one in the economy in producing the particular type of products, the trouble in
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that unit may spread to the whole economy.  This implies that the U-form economy
is more fragile to external shocks.  In contrast, with many duplications and a weak
interdependence between units of the M-form hierarchy, the adverse effects of an
external shock to one or several units on the whole organization will likely spread in
a slower and weaker way.  That is, the effects of shocks in an M-form hierarchy can
be localized.
The effects of region-specific shocks and industry-specific shocks to the U-form
and M-form economies are also different.  In the U-form economy, regional shocks
affect not only the local economy but also affect the whole economy through strong
regional interdependence.  The adverse effects of the collapse of CMEA is a good
example.  In the M-form economy, a region-specific shock may not affect the
economy as a whole because industries are spread out in many regions.  The
sustainability of the Chinese economy during the Cultural Revolution illustrates this
point.  During that period, some regional economies in China collapsed (due to
factional conflicts) but the national economy did not:  national income dropped in
only two years (-7.2% in 1967 and -6.5% in 1968), and recovered quickly afterwards.
On the other hand, since different regions have similar industrial compositions,
an industry-specific shock may affect all regions but in a similar way.  This may
reduce the aggregate adverse effect for several reasons:  each region is better capable
of dealing with the shock locally since the magnitude of the shock is smaller; regions
may better adjust to new environment by learning from each other since all regions
face similar shocks; and the incentive may become less a problem because the shock
is transformed into a systematic one in the M-form organization rather than an
idiosyncratic one as in the U-form organization (see below).
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Incentives
In a U-form hierarchy, incentives of subordinates are designed for
implementing commands from the above since coordination at the center has the
highest priority.  Agents are subject to frequent and arbitrary control by their
superiors, and thus they try to avoid any changes or risks (Ericson, 1991).  In an M-
form organization, coordination at the center is not so critical, thus providing semi-
autonomy together with higher powered incentives to local governments may be
optimal.  Indeed, in China, local governments have not been subject to arbitrary
control from above for tasks within their autonomy for more than twenty years.
After further decentralization in the reform, local governments have more incentive
to build up their regional empires and have less interest in promotion to a higher
rank.
Because the regions are self-contained with delegated authority and because
different regions engage in similar composition of activities, aggregate indicators like
growth in revenue or output reflect more on the true performance of the government
than noises.  Therefore, tournament or yardstick competition between regions is a
powerful tool for providing incentives by filtering out common or systematic
uncertainties (Holmstrom, 1982).  In China regional governments often take a great
pride in being ranked in first place in a competition among neighboring regions.  The
public and the media also place great importance on such a ranking.  This type of
incentive would be less effective and more costly to provide to ministries in the U-
form hierarchies because idiosyncratic uncertainty is more significant.
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Commitment Through Decentralization
In any economy, incentives cannot be really created unless the government is
able to make a credible commitment for not expropriating promised incomes and not
subsidizing loss makers.  Absence of such a commitment was a legacy of centralized
economies that led to the "ratchet effect" ("excess" profits were constantly siphoned
away, Berliner, 1957) and "the soft budget constraint" (loss makers were continually
bailed out, Kornai, 1980).  This lack of credible commitment is a fundamental
problem in centralized economies because the state is too powerful to tie its hands.
In contrast, credible commitment may be achieved under decentralization.
Dewatripont and Maskin (1991) argue that dispersed banks and decentralized
information structures can harden the budget constraint.  This is because when a
bank is constrained by the funds available, additional financing must come from
another bank.  In such a case, inefficient ex post renegotiation (say, due to asymmetric
information between the new and old banks) reduces the returns and thus the
incentives of the new bank from refinancing.   This in part explains why the budget37
constraint is harder for township and village enterprises in China, since most of them
borrow from small rural credit cooperatives.
During China's decentralization, many upper level government departments
and bureaus were removed or merged, and the number of bureaucrats was cut down.
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), this reduces information channels between
the superior and the subordinates, which in turn reduces influence costs.  Thus a
better commitment may be achieved as less information reaches the top.
The central government in the former Soviet Union retained strong
discretionary power during its reforms.  In contrast, China's reform policy of
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decentralization of authority to local governments makes it difficult for the central
government to use its discretion.   In his study of the history of economic38
development, Weingast (1993) emphasizes the role of decentralized political
institutions in achieving credible commitment to thriving markets by the state.  The
crucial aspect of what he called "market-preserving federalism" is that the central
government's authority to make economic policy must be limited and this authority
must be placed in the hands of the local governments.  This is viewed as the key to
solving the "fundamental political dilemma of an economic system:"  a government
strong enough to protect property rights is also strong enough to confiscate the
wealth of its citizens.  One of the key differences between China's and Russia's
reforms, as seen by Weingast, is that China proceeded in this direction but Russia did
not.
Experimental Approach, Learning, and Institutional Changes
In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, some experiments had been
introduced in their reforms before 1989.  However, the experiments were often
unsuccessful; even when they were successful in the local area, they were rarely
promoted nationwide.  Economists tend to believe that regional experiment is not the
right approach to reform a planned economy.  However, one major feature of the
Chinese reform is its success in using local experiments and in adopting the "bottom-
up" approach (Chen, Jefferson and Singh, 1992, and McMillan and Naughton, 1992).
Then a question arises:  why is China so special in using experimental approaches?
In a U-form organization, with a high degree of interdependence between
operating units, allowing one or a few regions to do experiments may be very costly
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or perhaps not feasible.  This is because experiments generate shocks and may
disturb normal operations of the economy regardless of the success or failure of the
experiments evaluated locally.  This makes the scope of regional experiments more
limited and chances of success smaller.  Even when an experiment was a success in
a particular industry or region, its relevancy to other industries and other regions is
less significant because of heterogeneity across operating units.  Given these features
of the U-form hierarchy, economic reforms will more likely be carried out in an "up-
down" fashion, in which decisions for changes have to be more centralized to
minimize transition costs.  In this sense, the U-form organization makes the
institution more rigid and more difficult to change through local experiments.
In the M-form organization, however, the regional interdependence is relatively
weak, so even a failure in the experiment will not considerably disturb the whole
economy.  In this case, the regional experimental strategy of reform in an M-form
organization is less costly and more feasible.  Under the M-form structure, large scale
regional experiments can be carried out, many regions have a chance to develop a
large variety of "mutants," and the central government may be able to compare and
select among various alternatives.   Furthermore, because adjacent regions are similar39
in terms of economic structure, a successful experiment in one region can be
relatively easily promoted to other regions.  Hence, under the M-form organization,
reforms may proceed more efficiently with the "bottom-up" approach,  which40
provides a less costly way of learning to establish and to use market institutions in
a unprecedented environment.  This makes the M-form organization more flexible in
the institutional evolutionary process.41
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6. The M-Form Hierarchy and the Non-State Sector in China
6.1.  Direct Effects of the M-form Hierarchy on the Non-State Sector
The M-form organization is directly responsible for fast entry and expansion
of the non-state sector under the condition that the existing hierarchy is not destroyed
in one stroke.  The most relevant aspects of the M-form organization are those
associated with the two bottom levels of government, that is, township and village
governments in the rural area, and district and neighborhood governments in the
urban area.  In what follows, local governments refer to the two bottom levels of
government.
Incentives and Authority of Setting Up Non-State Enterprises
The major responsibility of a local government in the M-form is regional
development and welfare.  Compared to their counterparts in the U-form economy,
regional governments in China pay less attention to bargaining with the higher
authorities because they have less to gain from bargaining within the hierarchy.  The
local government has to raise revenue on its own without much help from above, and
so it has strong incentives to set up and to support local enterprises for revenue
generating and employment purposes.   Some scholars even view a township or42
village as a "corporation," and the government of the township as the board of
directors and the management team of the corporation (Oi, 1992).
A field research found that a significant portion of the net profit of township
and village enterprises was used for the administrative budget of township and
village governments (Rural Policy Research Division of the Central Committee
Secretariat, 1986).  In another sampling survey, researchers found that 77.5 percent
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of the village administrative budget came from the village enterprises and that most
village government officials responded that one of the major motivations for setting
up village enterprises was to expand their administrative budget (Li, 1987).
A Harder Budget Constraint for Non-State Enterprises
One pervasive problem with state-owned enterprises is soft budget constraints
(Kornai, 1980).  This problem is particularly serious for enterprises affiliated with
central and provincial governments.  However, at bottom levels of the hierarchy,
financial resources available to local branches of the state banks and rural credit
cooperatives and to local governments are very limited, and non-state enterprises do
not have easy access to subsidies and credits as do state-owned enterprises (but still
better than private enterprises).  This limited power of community governments
disables them from bailing out loss-making community enterprises, thus enabling
them to commit to terminating troubled enterprises (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990).
Hence, the budget constraints for non-state enterprises are much harder than the
state-owned enterprises.  With hard (or harder) budget constraints, community
governments are more conscious about risks and profitability and, in the final
analysis, the efficiency of their enterprises.
The number of township-village enterprises that went bankrupt during the
1989-91 retrenchment could be used as evidence for the harder budget constraints in
the non-state sector.  In 1989, about three million township-village enterprises went
bankrupt, or were taken over by other township and village enterprises nationwide,
while in the same year almost all loss-making state-owned enterprises were bailed
out by the state.   In 1990, the loss-making township and village enterprises43
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accounted for 7.5% of all township and village enterprises and the figure dropped to
4.6% in 1991.  In contrast, the loss-making state enterprises accounted for 31% of all
the state enterprises in 1990.44
Horizontal Relationship Between Regions and Emergence of Markets
An important feature, which distinguishes the M-form hierarchy from the U-
form hierarchy, is the horizontal, and potentially market-oriented, relationship
between regions and between regional governments, despite the fact relationship
between a local government and its superior or its subordinate is still vertical.  Thus
horizontal relationships between regions have developed, first, to create a condition
for market-oriented transactions and trade among enterprises across the regions and
outside the planning scope, and second, to generate competition between regions for
getting rich first and fast, and third, to facilitate learning by one region through
imitating another region for successful reform policies or development strategies.
This is how the market mechanism in China emerged at such a fast pace within the
existing hierarchical system.
In contrast, in the U-form hierarchy, transactions between two enterprises must
advance through their common superior.  The high degree of specialization requires
rigorous administrative coordination and thus development of the horizontal
relationship inside a U-form hierarchy may become damaging.  It is then difficult for
the market mechanism to emerge and evolve within the existing hierarchical system.45
Regional competition will not be efficient unless factors can move freely.
During the reform period, constraints on capital and labor movement have been
gradually relaxed, especially in the southern coastal areas.  In fast growing areas like
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Guangdong and Jiangsu, many non-state enterprises hire more than half of their labor
from inland provinces like Sichuan and Hunan.   Capital poured into these areas as46
well, as shown by the substantial increase in bank deposits in the last few years.47
Development of Entrepreneurship and Use of Local Knowledge
With the weak bargaining position in the hierarchy, low-ranking government
bureaucrats' temptation for promotion within the hierarchy have been greatly
reduced.  Rather, many bureaucrats turned to entrepreneurs, by either quitting their
jobs to join a business company or running the government like a corporation.
Instead of implementing commands from the above, their major job is to use their
autonomous power in making profits.  Entrepreneurship is developed among many
local government bureaucrats or Party cadres, a hard-to-believe phenomenon in the
U-form hierarchical economy or in the hierarchical government in the market
economy.48
Government bureaucrats' knowledge and information about local economies
and government policies, their connections with the local community, and their past
experience in coordination, are all valuable assets.  In China, the existing organization
is not destroyed at one stroke and government bureaucrats are transformed into
entrepreneurs in the reform.  Hence, the valuable organizational capital and human
capital accumulated and embodied in the M-form hierarchy are better utilized in
developing non-state enterprises (Qian and Stiglitz, 1993).  This is particularly
important for China because of the scarcity in its human resources.
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The Roles of the Central and Higher Regional Governments
Partly due to the unpopular political movements in the Culture Revolution, the
central government in China has committed to economic development as the "central
task" since the beginning of economic reform.  The government officially encouraged
people to get rich, thereby allowing some people and some regions to become rich
earlier or quicker than others.  The reform policies of decentralization, which can be
regarded as utilizing the features of an M-form organization, strongly encouraged
local governments and entrepreneurs to experiment with various alternatives and
hence opened up the way for the "bottom-up" reform.
In other aspects, the roles of the central government in the Chinese reform are
limited.  The fast growth of the non-state sector is not in the plan of the government,
but rather almost a spontaneous process under a relaxed political and economic
environment.  The central government acknowledged openly that the fast growth of
the non-state sector was an unexpected surprise.   China's case demonstrates that49
with commitment to economic development and commitment to decentralization,
which may not be done consciously, reforms can go very far even with the limited
roles of the central government, given the M-form structure and incentives to lower-
level government in expanding non-state enterprises.
Compared to the central government's role in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, China's central government is relatively passive in guiding reforms.
It has not provided any coherent plan for the reform.  It gives a green light for local
experimentation, and it approves and promotes successful reform measures
discovered in regional experiments.   At the same time, it also imposes limits on50
reforms or institutional changes, for instance, it continues to restrict activities of state-
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owned enterprises and it is against mass privatization.  The observed gradualism in
China is, to a large extent, a reflection of these binding limits.  However, the central
government is pragmatic and it accommodates its policies to the new situation.  The
attitude of the central government toward township and village enterprises is a good
example:  it discriminated against township and village enterprises in the early 1980s,
then turned to support them several years later after discovering their vitality.
Most provincial governments are authorized to experiment with different
reform measures in their provinces within the limits set by the central government.
This helps to explain why there are large variations in the reforms from province to
province.  In many cases, a higher level of regional government protected their lower
level governments and the non-state enterprises in time political atmosphere at the
center turned against them.
6.2.  Interactions Between the M-Form Organization and Other Reform Policies
Although we primarily emphasize the importance of the M-form hierarchy and
decentralization policies for the entry and expansion of the non-state sector in China,
we also regard many other reform measures, such as the open-door policy, the dual
price system and the success of agricultural reforms, as important.  We argue,
however, that the achievements of these measures are better understood within our
analytical framework of the M-form organization.
The Open-Door Policy
Thanks to the open-door policy, foreign technology and investments come to
China, and non-state enterprises have a chance to access international markets and
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resources.  For the enterprises which use input supply from abroad and sell their
products in the international market, the existing planning system holds little
constraint on them and they are completely market oriented.  More generally, the
open-door policy affects all non-state enterprises.  Imports of ideas, concepts,
technologies, and especially, international market competition, helped to create a
market environment that gradually eroded the old planning mechanism.
Linkages between the open-door policy and the features of the M-form
organization are close, and its influence for expansion of the non-state sector is
significant.  A crucial component of the open-door policy is the establishment of
special economic zones, which are experimental regions for not just attracting foreign
investments, but also learning to establish and to use market institutions.  In fact, all
of those special zones are located outside the old industrial bases and in remote areas
where the central government control is weak.  This ensures a maximum autonomy
of the special zones and an isolation of potential adverse effects of experiments from
the rest of the economy.  A dominant majority of enterprises in the special economic
zones are in the non-state sector.  It is these special zones that pull up the
neighboring non-state enterprises as seen most strikingly in the Pearl River Delta of
Guangdong.
The Dual Price System
The dual price system is by no means a brand new practice.  It was in fact
originated before 1979.  China has had two prices for grain (the official price and
negotiated price) since the 1950s.  During the administrative decentralization in 1958
and 1970, a large number of small non-state enterprises emerged under local
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governments' support.  Because those enterprises were outside the planning scope,
the market price on top of the planned price has to be tolerated for these enterprises'
survival.  In the Cultural Revolution, central planning system was crippled, and input
allocations to many state-owned enterprises were not guaranteed by the plan.  Thus,
horizontal cooperation (hengxiang xiezuo) between regions and between enterprises,
including semi-legal black markets and barter trading, started to develop within the
state sector.  The dual price system of the 1980s is merely an official legalization and
an increase of its scope of the existing practice.51
The dual price system has been controversial among economists.  Critics
emphasize its effects of corruption, inefficient bargaining (that is, rent-seeking), and
supply diversion from the state to the non-state sector, etc. (e.g., Wu and Zhao, 1987,
and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992).  Advocates argue that facing a market price
at the margin, the managers in the state sector will make the right decisions because
the planned quotas becomes lump-sum taxes/subsidies in effect (e.g., Byrd, 1987, and
McMillan and Naughton, 1992).  We focus on a different effect of the dual price
system.  If for some reason the price cannot be liberalized at one stroke, introducing
legalized markets for all goods (an important distinction between Chinese reforms
and Eastern Europe reforms before 1989) has a critical benefit for facilitating entry
and expansion of the non-state sector, although it is at the margin and is in an
imperfect way.  This is because a necessary condition of fast growth of the non-state
sector is the existence of markets for intermediate goods which include capital goods
and materials.  Although the state sector faces two prices for one product, the non-
state sector faces only one price, the market price.  In a more or less competitive
environment with market price signals, the non-state enterprises are likely to be more
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efficient than the state sector, which is essential for fast expansion of the non-state
sector.
The Success of Agriculture Reforms
The development of the non-state sector has benefitted from agriculture
reforms in at least three aspects:  (i) capital accumulation; (ii) release of labor force;
and (iii) creation of demands.  However, surplus labor, financial savings and potential
of markets by themselves cannot be transformed into growth automatically.
Institutions are required to facilitate trade, and entrepreneurs are needed to organize
production and distribution.  It is the M-form organization that provides the
flexibility within the system for efficient utilization of those favorable conditions.  For
example, many entrepreneurs in the non-state sector were in fact Party cadres or
former commune leaders, and their organizational experience and connections in the
local government have been turned into assets for the non-state enterprises.
The success of the agricultural reform itself is helped by the M-form structure.
The household responsibility system was based on experiments initiated from
regional governments (villages, township, county and province) before it was
promoted nationwide by the central government.  Strong motivation and initiatives
by local governments, tolerance of the central government, and rapid promotion of
this system, are all made possible by the M-form organization structure.  In addition,
with a more decentralized system, industrial supplies to agriculture like agriculture
machinery and spare parts, chemical fertilizers, transportation service, are more
reliable and less vulnerable to external shocks, and individual households are likely
to deal with competitive suppliers, not a monopoly.  These seem to be different from
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the situation in the former Soviet Union.
7.  Concluding Remarks
We have provided a comparative analysis of transition from institutional
perspectives, and have addressed issues of how initial institutional environments
differ between China and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, how reform
and transition strategies in China depend on institutional conditions; and how
institutional changes of decentralization affect China's transition path and outcomes.
In particular, the decentralized M-form organization has provided room for the fast
entry and expansion of the non-state sector which made the economic transition
relatively smooth compared to those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
In this final section, we briefly discuss implications of the non-state sector for further
reforms in China and lessons from the Chinese experience for other economies in
transition.
Denationalization of the State Sector in China
The recent Eastern European experiences have shown that massive and fast
privatization of the state sector is rather costly.  Given the initial condition of the M-
form organization, it may be easier and less costly for China to follow the
evolutionary approach of developing the non-state sector rather than the
revolutionary approach of massive and fast privatization.  Eventually, the state sector
will be forced to share a minor role in the national economy.52
This has important implications for the possibility of denationalization, instead
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of privatization, of state-owned enterprises in China in the future.  Denationalization
is a transformation process which includes successful non-state enterprises taking
over or merging with state enterprises; state enterprises are converted into joint
ventures with either domestic or foreign non-state enterprises; state enterprises are
reorganized into joint stock companies, etc.  In either case, the transformation may
include the sale of small-sized state enterprises or sale of parts of large- and medium-
sized state enterprises.   In fact, recently takeovers and mergers by the non-state53
enterprises have already emerged in China and reorganization to joint stock
companies has also become a fashion.  With the crowding out effects of takeover,
mergers and transformation of ownership, the economy will eventually rely more on
the non-state sector.  This is perhaps an alternative way to privatization and a less
painful path of transition for China.
To the extent that the majority of the non-state sector has community or local
government ownership rather than private ownership at the present time, China can
be better described as "decentralized market socialism" according to its ownership
structure (Qian and Xu, 1993).  It is decentralized because non-state properties are not
owned by the central government; it remains socialism because properties are owned
by organized communities like townships or villages (von Mises, 1981).   What is less54
clear at this point is whether this type of decentralized socialist ownership is a mere
transition phenomenon, or whether it is sustainable for a long time.  In any event,
decentralized market socialism is clearly a unique outcome of China's gradual
transition process.
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Lessons for Other Economies in Transition
We believe that the lessons which other transition economies can learn from
China rely on the correct understanding of China's reforms in the first place.  Our
analyses have demonstrated that the success of China's particular gradual reform
strategies depends on its initial institutional conditions (as well as other micro- and
macro-economic environment which are not discussed here), that is, the transition is
a path dependent evolutionary process.  For this reason, China's experience can not,
and should not, be simply copied to other economies in transition.  One of the
important implications of our analyses is that the difference in the initial institutional
conditions concerning the organizational structure of the planning hierarchy should
be taken into account when making policy suggestions for other countries based on
China's reform experience.
The central idea underlying our theory is that, in addition to ownership,
organization structure of the economy matters.  We have discovered several
important linkages between the reform process and the organization structure of
centralized economies, which have policy implications, though tentative, for other
economies in transition.  First, decentralization and deconcentration of the state sector
are desirable in their own right, and for facilitating entry and growth of private
business (Aghion, Burgess, and Xu, 1993).  There are several reasons:  (i) Although
privatization, understood as a process of simply transferring ownership from the state
to citizens, might be achieved relatively quickly, privatization as a mechanism to
achieve efficient organizational structure and competitiveness is bound to be a long
historical process.  Typically, privatization process per se does not automatically
change industrial structure of the economy (the Czech Republic is an example).  If
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the U-form structure is not changed, the fundamental problems related to the high
degree of concentration may still remain after privatization.  (ii) If for some reason
privatization will be delayed, then there is a need for explicit policies to maintain and
restructure the existing state-owned enterprises.  The policies of decentralization and
deconcentration of state enterprises are beneficial in generating competition and
improving performance (perhaps with an exception of the natural monopoly
industries).  And (iii) decentralization and deconcentration of the state sector will
facilitate and speed up entry and growth of new private businesses, which is a vital
part of privatization both in long run and in short run.  The growth of the private
sector in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has so far remained limited to
trade, services, and construction, while other sectors such as manufacturing industries
have not yet been much affected.  The monopoly and monopsony power of the
concentrated state enterprises or newly-privatized firms are one of the major barriers
to entry and growth.  Decentralization and deconcentration will reduce these barriers.
In addition, decentralization of financial institutions also helps private firms to access
credit, which is again critical for the fast growth of the private sector.
Second, a competent and limited central government combined with many
vigorous and competitive regional governments is the right balance of power for the
state in transition.  This amounts to reducing and restricting discretionary power of
the central government and strengthening the local governments' authority in
regional reforms and development at the same time.  The scope of the central
government's authority should be restricted, and the central government should be
competent in executing only those reform programs that regional governments
couldn't or are unwilling to do, for instance, reforms that are related to maintaining
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macroeconomic stability and preventing regional protectionism.  The balance of
power between the central and regional governments has several benefits:  (i)
Decentralization helps to create competition among regions.  (ii) With less
discretionary power by the central government, regional transition and development
will be less affected by the fluctuations of the central government policies.  This will
reduce uncertainties from the political opportunistic behavior or power struggles
between different factions of the central government.  And (iii) a better commitment
can be achieved with the limited discretion of the central government, so the
problems of the ratchet effect and the soft budget constraints can be mitigated.
Third, given the unprecedented and complicated nature of the transition from
centralized to market economies, an experimental approach may be a less costly way
of learning to establish and to use market institutions in transition.  Economic theory
does not provide sufficient guidance for the transition.  Other countries' experience
may be relevant, but must be adapted to the own country's situation.  By the
decentralized nature of market economy and by the very nature of the transition, a
large amount of bottom initiated institutional experimentation is needed to acquire
knowledge in transition.  Although the U-form structure is not suitable for large scale
experiments as we analyzed in the paper, it is still possible to establish some special
areas for the purpose of experimentation.  To avoid interfering with the normal
operation of the economy, these regions should be located outside the old industrial
bases and far away from the central control, as was done in China.  Alternatively,
after decentralization and deconcentration of the state sector, the economy will be
more suitable for local experiments.
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2.  Data sources in this paper are from Statistical Yearbook of China (various issues
from 1985 to 1992), otherwise noted.
3. Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau on the 1992 National
Economic and Social Development, February 18, 199
4. The export-GNP ratios are calculated based on the official exchange rate and
are upward biased.  But the dramatic increase of export share in GNP during
the reform is unmistaken.
5. Data source for Hungary and Poland is from Table 9.1 of Kornai (1992).
6. For example, Summers (1992) expressed this view when he highly praised
China's reform performance.  Sachs (1992) also expressed similar ideas during
his interview with the Chinese Journal of Comparative Economic and Social
Systems.
7. This view is reflected in Singh (1991), McMillan and Naughton (1992), and
Chen, Jefferson and Singh (1992).
8. We deliberately avoid the issue of the state sector.  Evaluation of the reform
in the state-sector has been controversial among China experts and Chinese
economists.
9. We only focus on the non-agriculture sector in this paper.
10. An interesting and confusing fact is that many rural enterprises are located in
urban areas.  They are called "rural enterprises" simply because they are
supervised by rural community governments (e.g. township or village
governments) and the majority of their employees are not registered urban
residents.
Endnotes
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11. This is known as "one factory, two systems" (yichang liangzhi) in China,
referring to the planned system for the state-owned part, and the market
system for the collective part.
12. If a state-owned enterprise is converted to a joint-stock company or limited
liability company ("corporatization") or becomes a joint venture, it will be
reclassified into the catagory of "others."  As a result, it will not be regarded
as "state-owned" anymore, despite the fact that the state may still own the
majority interests.  This may cause interpretation problems of the non-state
sector in the future as more and more such a conversion occur starting in 1992.
13. About one-half of "others" can be counted as truly private.
14. For example, the famous computer company Stone Group is officially a "large
collective" under Haidian district in the Beijing municipality, but actually run
by a group of private businessmen.  In Wenzhou municipality of the Zhejiang
province, any business establishment with more than three co-owners is
classified as a "collective," and is often called a "township" or "village"
enterprise.
15. See Kornai (1986) for the private sector development in Hungary before 1989.
16. In 1957 the first five year plan was finished.  At that time, there were still
many state-private jointly-owned enterprises (gongsi heying).  One year later,
during the Great Leap Forward in 1958, the share of the state sector jumped
to 90%. 
17. The Information Center of the State Planning Commission in China has
already predicted that by the year 2000 only about one-quarter of industrial
production will be produced by the state-sector in China.  However, see
footnote 11 for qualification to this statement.
18. From 1982 to 1987, the annual growth rate of the total factor productivity of
the TVEs is 12.5% at the national level, and 15% in the coastal areas (Xu, 1991).
In contrast, from 1978 to 1985, the annual growth rate of the total factor
productivity of the state-owned enterprises is 1.3% at the national level (Chen,
et. al., 1988).  Another piece of evidence comes from Xiao (1991).  Using the
provincial data from 1985 to 1987, Xiao shows a significant positive correlation
between the total factor productivity of the provincial economies and the non-
state sector share of the industrial output (with an exception of Shanghai).
19. These five provinces are all the coastal provinces.  Because of the rapid
growth, the share of industrial output of these five provinces in the national
total rose from 30% in 1985 to 37% in 1990.
20. The fast entry and expansion of the non-state sector has considerable impact
on the state sector through increased competition, which forces state-owned
enterprises either to ask for more subsidies from the government or to change
in order to survive.  Given the shrinking government budget revenue, reforms
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of the state-owned sector become more urgent than ever.
21. A Statistical Survey of Chinese Rural Enterprises, 1991.
22.  Byrd and Lin (1990) contains a detailed study of rural industry in four counties
in China:  Wuxi of Jiangsu, Nanhai of Guangdong, Shangrao of Jiangxi and
Jieshou of Anhui.
23. It is also known as the organization by "branches."
24. In the case of the Soviet Union, ministries of the central government had
controlled all enterprises in heavy industry while the regional governments
had controlled some light industrial enterprises.
25. Lenin had this famous remark in his book The State and Revolution (1917):  "The
whole of [socialist] society will become a single office and a single factory."
This ideology can be attributed to Marx.
26. Strictly speaking, each functional or industrial bureau in a region is subject to
"dual leadership" (shuanchong lingdao) of the regional government (by block)
and of the upper-level functional or industrial department (by branch).  But
the former is more important than the latter.
27. "Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and the conditions are so
complex that it is far better to have the initiatives come from both the central
and the local authorities than from one source alone.  We must not follow the
example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the
central authorities, shackling the local authorities and denying them the right
to independent action."  "The central authorities want to develop industry, and
so do the local authorities."  "The central authorities should take care to give
scope to the initiative of provinces and municipalities, and the latter in their
turn should do the same for the prefectures, counties, districts and townships;
in neither case should the lower levels be put in a strait-jacket." (Mao, 1977)
28. The nick-name for this fiscal decentralization is "eating in separate kitchens"
(fenzao chifan).
29. Although in some cases getting project approved by the upper level
government is still needed, which is known as "project registration" (lixiang).
30. To some extent, the local government holds "local government or regional
property rights."
31. Many economists criticized these reform policies on the basis of their adverse
macroeconomic consequences, for example, declining fiscal revenue, pro-
cyclical effect of the fiscal sharing schemes (contract is not indexed to
inflation), and loss of control over fiscal instruments and credit.  All of these
tend to undermine the macroeconomic stability of the economy (Lou, 1991).
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32. In order to make our points clearer and sharper, we need to make some
abstractions which may make the descriptions not identical to the reality.  But
the essential features of the reality is preserved in our abstraction.
33. Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975, 1985) first analyzed the unitary form
and multi-divisional form of large organizations in the U.S.  The problems
with the traditional Soviet-type planning system are also well described (for
example, Kornai, 1992, and Ericson, 1991).  In addition, many experts on China
have studied its problems from administrative decentralization, such as
wasteful duplications, not exploiting scale economies, local protectionism, and
market fragmentation (for example, Wong, 1987, and Wu and Reynolds, 1988).
34. In all centrally planned economies the curricula of universities were designed
by the center to train the labor force for utilizing specialization and division
of labor.  The design of the fields of concentration has been narrowly focused
and students were more specialized than their counterparts in market
economies.
35. In a multi-divisional firm, day-to-day coordination is delegated to divisions,
which enables the general office to concentrate on long-term and strategic
decisions (Chandler, 1966, and Williamson, 1985).
36. The logic here is similar to Weitzman's thesis of price versus quantity
(Weitzman, 1974).  The more decentralized mode of control (price in that case)
is better when inputs complementarity is weak so the marginal benefit curve
is flatter.
37. Alternatively, Qian and Xu (1993) suggest that even if banks are large, as long
as the projects not being financed exclusively by one bank, then achieving
agreements among many banks is more difficult at the time of renegotiation,
which makes the budget constraint harder.
38. During the 1990 retrenchment, the central government tried to revoke fiscal
revenue sharing schemes and to re-centralize investment decisions, but
encountered strong opposition from the governors of provinces led by the
Guangdong Governor and gave it up.
39. An important component of China's reform is the establishment of special
economic zones with the explicit purpose for experimentation.
40. However, the bottom-up approach has its own limitations, for example, in the
reforms of the tax system and the financial system.
41. Experimentation under the decentralized market system is important for the
growth of the West, as economic historian Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986)
explain:  "This diffusion of authority was interwoven with the widespread use
of experiment to answer questions of technology, marketing, and organization
for which answers could be found in no other way; and with the emergence
of great diversity in the West's modes of organizing economic activity."
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42. The rapid growth of the commune-brigade enterprises in Jiangsu province in
the mid-1970s had already shown the potential of the M-form structure in the
development of non-state enterprises.
43. People's Daily, Overseas Edition, March 23, 1990.
44. Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye, No.8, 1991.
45. Kornai (1992) is right that the horizontal market coordination is incompatible
to the vertical bureaucratic system (of the U-form organization).
46. It is estimated that there are about 70 million "floating migrants" every year
in recent years in China looking for temporary jobs (People's Daily, Overseas
Edition, p.8, March 10, 1993).
47. For example, specialized banks in Zhongshan municipality of Guangdong
province borrowed about 2.1 billion yuan through inter-bank loans from other
regions (Qian and Stiglitz, 1993).  In 1992, total bank deposits in Hainan
province (now a special economic zone) was 20 billion yuan, increased by
142.6% over the previous year and most of the increase were deposits from
other provinces (People's Daily, Overseas Edition, p.2, March 3, 1993).
48. It is not uncommon to see a person has several titles on the name card:  Party
secretary, Chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO of a township or
village corporation.
49. Deng Xiaoping admitted in 1988 that the amazing growth of the township and
village enterprises was completely unexpected and was the greatest
achievement of the reform (Zhongguo xiangzhen qiye, 1989).
50. This strategy is known in China as the one of "groping for stones to cross the
river" (mozhe shitou guohe).
51. Although there were similar phenomena in the Soviet Union (Berliner, 1957),
the influence there was far less important than that in China.
52. Lau (1992) studied the experience of Taiwan and South Korea where the
reduction of the public enterprise sector has been achieved mainly through the
growth of the private sector, rather than privatization of the state enterprises.
53. The denationalization process also likely incorporates spontaneous
privatization.
54. Some economists further argue that even in the state-sector, many of the
Chinese state-owned enterprises have become de facto local governments' or
regional properties (see Granick, 1990).
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Table 1.1  China: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 1978-1991
Growth National Urban Household Export/G Budget
of GNP Retail Cost of Bank De- NP Deficit/G
Price Living posits/GNP NP
Index Index
1978 11.7% 0.7% 0.7% 5.87% 4.67% surplus
1979 7.6% 2.0% 1.9% 7.05% 5.31% 5.16%
1980 7.9% 6.0% 7.5% 8.94% 6.07% 2.85%
1981 4.4% 2.4% 2.5% 10.97% 7.70% 2.07%
1982 8.8% 1.9% 2.0% 13.01% 7.97% 2.18%
1983 10.4% 1.5% 2.0% 15.36% 7.55% 2.12%
1984 14.7% 2.8% 2.7% 17.45% 8.34% 1.75%
1985 12.8% 8.8% 11.9% 18.96% 9.45% 0.80%
1986 8.1% 6.0% 7.0% 23.08% 11.16% 2.15%
1987 10.9% 7.3% 8.8% 27.19% 13.01% 2.21%
1988 11.0% 18.5% 20.7% 27.12% 12.60% 2.49%
1989 4.0% 17.8% 16.3% 32.34% 12.29% 2.36%
1990 5.2% 2.1% 1.3% 39.77% 16.88% 2.91%
1991 7.7% 2.9% 5.1% 45.88% 19.30% 3.34%
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Table 1.2  China: Annual Consumption Per Capita (kilogram)
Grain Edible Pork Poultry Eggs Seafood
Vegetable
Oil
1978 195.46 1.60 7.67 0.44 1.97 3.50
1991 234.50 5.89 17.44 1.98 7.10 6.79
Table 1.3  China: Living Space Per Person (square-meter)
Urban Rural
1978 3.6 8.1
1991 6.9 18.5
Table 1.4  China: Consumer Durable Per 100 Urban Households (sets)
Color Black/Whit Washing Refrigerat
Televisi e Television Machine or
on
1981 0.59 57.06 6.34 0.22
1991 68.41 43.93 80.58 48.70
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Table 1.5  China: Consumer Durable Per 100 Rural Households (sets)
Color Black/Whit Washing Refrigerato Tape
Television e Machine r Recorder
Television
1985 0.80 10.94 1.90 0.06 4.33
1991 6.44 47.53 10.99 1.64 19.64
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Table 3.1  China: Share of Gross Industrial Output Value by
Ownership
State- Non-State-
Owned Owned
Revolution 1949 26.25% 73.75%
1957 53.77% 46.23%
Great Leap 1958 89.17% 10.83%
Forward
Cultural 1966 90.18% 9.82%
Revolution
1969 88.71% 11.29%
1970 87.61% 12.39%
1971 85.91% 14.09%
1972 84.88% 15.12%
 1973 84.02% 15.98%
1974 82.41% 17.59%
1975 81.09% 18.91%
1976 78.33% 21.67%
1977 77.03% 22.97%
1978 77.63% 22.37%
Economic Reform 1979 78.47% 21.53%
1980 75.97% 24.03%
1981 74.76% 25.24%
1982 74.44% 25.56%
1983 73.36% 26.64%
1984 69.06% 30.94%
1985 64.86% 35.14%
1986 62.27% 37.73%
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1987 59.73% 40.27%
1988 56.80% 43.20%
1989 56.06% 43.94%
1990 54.60% 45.40%
1991 52.84% 47.16%
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Table 3.2  China: Average Annual Growth Rate of Rural Enterprises 1981-
1990
Number of Employme Total Industrial Export
Enterprises nt Output Output
1981-90 29.2% 11.9% 29.1% 28.1%
1986-90 8.6% 5.8% 25.4% 27.1% 65.6%
Table 3.3  China: Share of Selected Industrial Products Produced By Rural
Enterprises 1990
Coal Cement Cotton Paper Electric Canned
Cloth Fan Food
33.1% 27.5% 21.4% 38.2% 46.5% 39.1%
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Table 3.4  China: Share of Rural Enterprises in the National
Economy 1979-1990
Employme Total Output Industrial Exports
nt Output
1979 22.54% 7.18% 9.05%
1985 35.27% 16.45% 18.81% 4.80%
1990 38.61% 22.27% 25.29% 23.7%
Table 3.5  China: Share of Industrial Output As Percent of the Non-State Sector
1985-1990
Collectives Individual Others
Urban District and Cooperatives
Neighborhood
1985 45.17% 0% 0.98% 3.44%
1990 28.99% 0.50% 0.99% 9.65%
Rural Township Village Cooperatives
1985 22.28% 19.41% 4.44% 4.29%
1990 22.48% 22.04% 4.45% 10.89%
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Table 3.6  China: Composition of Rural Enterprises 1984-1990
Number of Enterprises Employment Total Output
Townshi Cooperative Townshi Cooperative Townshi Cooperativ
p and s and p and s and p and es and
Villages Individuals Villages Individuals Villages Individuals
1984 30.72% 69.28% 76.46% 23.54% 85.63% 14.37%
1985 15.13% 84.87% 62.00% 38.00% 75.27% 24.73%
1986 11.40% 88.60% 57.21% 42.79% 71.34% 28.66%
1987 9.04% 90.96% 53.59% 46.41% 67.89% 32.11%
1988 8.42% 91.58% 51.27% 48.73% 67.47% 32.53%
1989 8.22% 91.78% 50.40% 49.60% 66.44% 33.56%
1990 7.86% 92.14% 49.57% 50.43% 65.28% 34.72%
Source: A Statistical Survey of Chinese Rural Enterprises, 1991.
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Table 3.7  China: Expansion of Individual Business (million) 1981-1988
Number of Enterprises Employment 
Total of Total of
which: Rural which: Rural
Urban  Urban
1981 1.83 0.87 0.96 2.28 1.06 1.22
1982 2.63 1.13 1.50 3.20 1.36 1.84
1983 5.91 1.71 4.20 7.47 2.09 5.38
1984 9.30 2.22 7.08 13.03 2.91 10.12
1985 11.71 2.80 8.91 17.66 3.85 13.81
1986 12.11 2.91 9.20 18.46 4.08 14.38
1987 13.72 3.38 10.34 21.58 4.92 16.66
1988 14.53 23.05
Source: Beijing Review, February 27-March 5, 1989, and People's Daily, overseas edition,
March 11, 1989.
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Table 4.1  China: Distribution of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises by
Administrative Levels (1985)
Central Provincial and County
Government City Governments Government
Number of 3,825 31,254 35,263
Enterprises
Share in Total 19.57% 44.57% 8.98%
Industrial
Output
Source:  1985 Industrial Censor of China.
Table 4.2  Comparison of Size of Enterprises in China, Eastern Europe, 
the Soviet Union and the West, 1988 (Employment/Enterprise)
   Food Products   Wearing
Manufacturing Apparel
Czechoslovakia 2,930 1,609 6,600
The Soviet 806 290 402
Union
Hungary 460 925 307
Yugoslavia 311 243 402
China 145 75 80
Italy 96 71 71
United 35 67 25
Kingdom
Sources: (1) Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1988 Volume 1, United Nations, Geneva, 1989;
 (2) Business Monitor PA1002 Report on Census of Production, 1989, Central
Statistical Office, UK; and 
 (3) Statistical Yearbook of China, 1989 (pp.255-291), State Statistic Bureau,
Beijing.
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